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power limited -by the -provisions of the code relating to "other relief after
judgment."33 Such provisions have 'been held to relate to vacation and
34
modification of judgments after term.
The municipal courts of this state are not courts of general jurisdiction. The question therefore arises whether -they, too, have such an inherent power. In Consumer Packing Co. v.Hathman, 5 the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals logically applied the provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 1901.21,86 to hold that the Municipal Court of Cleveland (and therefore, presumably, all municipal courts) has -the same
rights and responsibilities with reference to the vacation of its judgments
within term as are possessed by the court of common pleas.
SAMUEL SONENFILD

CONFLICT OF LAWS
Federal and State Law
A statement in Randolph v. American Airlines, Inc.' reiterates the
point that federal law governs the rights and liabilities of the parties in
a lawsuit -involving an interstate shipment of baggage in an airline common carrier. The issue -related -to limitation of liability.

Personal Property: Estates
In the case of personal property, the Tight of a surviving spouse to
elect whether to take under the law or under the will is determined by
the law of the decedent's domicile at the -time of his death.' While
recognizing this as the ordinary rule, the court in the case of In re Estate
of Gould held that the law of Ohio, the situs of the property, governed,
rather than the law of the domicile (Bermuda), when the original probate proceedings were instituted in Ohio and there were no probate
proceedings elsewhere. The decision was based upon the interpretation
of certain statutory provisions. 4 It is interesting to note that the election
by the surviving spouse was permissible under Ohio law, but -that under
the law of Bermuda, a spouse had no right to elect.
Darrow v. Fifth Third Union Trust Company5 is in a similar vein,
T

c. 2325.
First National Bank of Dunkirk v. Smith, 102 Ohio St., 120, 130 N.E. 502 (1921).
's142 N.E.2d 675 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
s"In any civil case or proceeding if no special provision is made in sections 1901.01
to 1901.38, inclusive, of the Revised Code, the practice and procedure shall be the
same as courts of common pleas."
OHIO REV. CODE
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although a bit more complicated. While domiciled in Ohio, Mr. Darrow
created a aevocable living -trust. The situs of the trust property was Ohio.
While still domiciled in Ohio, Mr. Darrow also executed a will Thereafter, he moved to Florida and was domiciled there at the time of his
death. There was no probate in Florida, but there was an original probate in Ohio under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section
2107.11.0 By the terms of Ohio Revised Code section 2129.11, the administrator is -to proceed with the Ohio administration under the above
circumstances as though the decedent had been domiciled in Ohio at the
time of his death. The precise question was whether a widow who
elects to take under the statute of descent and distribution rather than
under the will may "invade" the trust property, thus obtaining part of
the -trust property in satisfaction of her election. The court held that
the law of Ohio, rather than the law of Florida, governed the determination of this question, and that the law of Ohio permits the widow to
invade the trust property if she elects to take under the statutes of descent and distribution.
Since, under Ohio Revised Code section 2129.11, referred to above,
the estate is to be administered as though the decedent -had been domiciled in Ohio, the law of Ohio governing probate of estates, including
the statutes of descent and distribution, will be applicable, said the
court. The court also noted that the law appears to be that the validity
of an -inter vivos trust is determined -by the law of the situs of the trust.
Although ,the present case did -not relate to validity, .the court evidently
found an analogy.
Torts
That the lex loci delicti governs with reference to the substantive law
of torts -is recognized in Flynn v. Litt 7 and Ellis v. Garwood.8
'103 Ohio App. 172, 174, 144 N.E.2d 878, 880 (1956).
2
REsTATEmEmr, CONFLICt OF LAws § 301, comment b (1934).
'140 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio Prob. 1956), a! 'd, 140 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio Ct. App.
1956), upon the reasoning and authorities contained in the opinion of the court

below.
I OIO REv. CODE

§5 2107.11, 2107.39, 2129.07, 2129.11.
'1 Ohio Op. 2d 104, 139 N.E.2d 112 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
' This section allows probate of the will of a person not domiciled in Ohio but leaving property there, if the will has not previously been admitted to probate at the
domicile. Note that the sections under consideration in this case were among those
involved in the previous case, supra n. 4.
"141 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio Cr. App. 1957) (duty of guest in automobile to protest
negligent driving and sufficiency of protest: sudden emergency).
8143 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio Cr. App. 1957) (right of action for wrongful death in
addition to workmen's compensation).
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Substance and Procedure
The familiar proposition that matters of procedure are governed by
the law of the forum9 is reiterated in Flynm v. Little.10 However, it is
,to be noted, as held in Spriggs v. Dredge," that the question whether a
-tort action survives the death of -the torrfeasor is governed by the law of
the place of the tort, at least if that law provides chat there is no survival. 12 Thus, the matter is considered substantive rather than procedural.

Full Faith and Credit: Alimony
Under the full faith and credit clause,13 a valid judgment for alimony
is entitled -to full faith and credit in a second state to the extent of the
amount already due and unpaid, and not subject -to reduction.14 This
mandate is recognized in Ditto v. Tiitto,1 which, however, is chiefly
concerned with another point not germane to this artide.
In an important dictum, -the court, in Bain v. Rose,'" upheld the
proposition that a decree freeing a person from any obligation to pay
alimony is likewise entitled to full faith and credit.

Full Faith and Credit: Award of Arbitrators
In an intriguing but troublesome (at least -to me) decision, the
court in McClure v. Boyle' refused to give full faith and credit to an
award rendered by Pennsylvania arbitrators and entered of record by a
prothonotary, although by Pennsylvania law it -is stipulated that an award
so entered shall have the effect of a judgment. The court was of the
opinion that there was no judgment in the Pennsylvania proceedings
and that -the full faith and credit clause extends only -to judicid proceedings and does -not extend -tomatters not included within the definition of
a judicial judgment. To the argument that judgments by confession are
§ 585 (1934).
- 141 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (requisites for requested instructions).
140 N.E.2d 45 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
"RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws

§ 390 (1934). See comment b of that section for the situation where the state of the tort has a survival statute and the forum
"2RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

does not.
"U.S. CONsT. Art. IV, § 1.
"Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910);
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 464
(1934).
138 N.E.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1955).
103 Ohio App. 297, 145 N.E.2d 319 (1957).
'T141 N.E.2d 229 (C.P. 1957).
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likewise entered by prothonotarles in Pennsylvania, but nevertheless are
regarded as judgments, the court replied -that Pennsylvania statutory law
specifically calls -them judgments.
Full Faith and Credit: Workmen's Compensation
Full faith and credit in workmen's compensation matters has presented some knotty problems and hairline distinctions. Ellis v. Garwood's
is an exceedingly important case in this field. A New York employee
within -the New York workmen's compensation law was killed in an
Ohio collision. His widow received compensation under the New York
law, which states that such compensation shall be the exclusive remedy
when -the employee is injured or killed -by the negligence of a fellowemployee. In the case under consideration, a fellow-employee was driving the car. The widow, as administratrix, brought an action for wrongful death against the driver of the car. Such an action is permissible by
Ohio law. Relying on Carroll v. Lanza,19 the court of appeals, reversing
the trial court, held that the full faith and credit clause does not prevent
Ohio from allowing the action.
To understand the significance of the decision, it must be pointed out
that in Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Hunt,20 the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the full faith and credit clause prevented a
second state from giving workmen's compensation to an employee who
had already received an award under .the workmen's compensation law of
the first state, whose laws, as interpreted, attempted to prohibit further
recovery under the compensation laws of any other state. Carroll v.
Lanza, which upheld rthe right -to sue a -third party in the second state,
despite the receipt of compensation in -the first state, distinguished the
Magnolia case upon the ground that in the Carroll case there was no
award or judgment, the payments starting automatically under the -terms
of the statute, without benefit of an award. Thus, the Carroll decision
was -eached on the basis that Arkansas, -the second- state, was not required to give full faith and credit to the statutes of Missouri, the .first
state, prohibiting remedies other than the Missouri compensation law.
It is not entirely dear from ,the report of Ellis v. Garwood, the Ohio case,
whether an award had -been rendered in New York, but apparently the
court was indifferent on that score. If an award was rendered in New
York, Carroll v. Lanza is distinguishable, and the Ohio case comes closer
to Magnolia. But it is still distinguishable from Magnolia by reason of
143 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
'349 U.S. 408 (1955).
:320 U.S. 430 (1943).
's
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the fact that Magnolia dealt with a second bite at workmen's compensation, whereas Carroll and Ellis deal with a tort action in a second state
against a third party. Perhaps the Supreme Court of the United States
will draw this distinction if the matter is presented to it. Moreover,
,there are other distinguishing features in Magnolia which apparently influenced the Court.

Full Faith and Credit: Custody
The questions of jurisdiction and full faith and credit in cases involving the custody of minor children have given rise -to a good deal of confusion and difference of opinion. 2l The most recent pronouncement by
the Supreme Court of Ohio occurs in the important case of Cunningham
v. Cunningham.22 A California court made a valid custody decree.
Thereafter, the mother and child moved to Ohio at the suggestion of -the
father. The move -to Ohio did not violate -the decree. Subsequently, the
father obtained a modification of the decree from the California court,
and in Ohio brought an action to obtain the child in accordance with the
modified decree. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that .the Ohio courts
were not required to give full faith and credit to the modified California
decree because -the mother and child had previously changed their domicile to Ohio, which fact left the Ohio courts free -to determine .the action
on ,the basis of the child's welfare. So far as full faith and credit is concerned, 'the continuing jurisdiction of the California court terminated with
the departure of the mother and child to a new domicile.
Another custody case is Bain v. Rose.23 In a valid Illinois proceeding, the court granted custody -to the mother. Later, the father brought
an action in Ohio, the then domicile of the mother and child, seeking to
obtain custody of the child. The mother contended that 'the court lacked
jurisdiction. It was held that the court had jurisdiction and that despite
the full faith and credit clause, the Ohio courts have a right 'to determine
custody in accordance with 'the child's welfare. Inasmuch as the child
was domiciled in Ohio, its courts undoubtedly had jurisdiction. 24 And
apparently the court did not mean to imply -that Ohio would re-examine
-the facts existing at the time of 'the Illinois action, but meant, rather, that
"See STumBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 324-29 (2d ed. 1951).
' 166 Ohio St. 203, 141 N.E.2d 172 (1957).
' 103 Ohio App. 297, 145 N.E.2d 319 (1957).
" See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 145 (1934). However, the court
seemed to base jurisdiction on the fact that the child was found in the county.

